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The average annual real return on short-term (90-day) U.S. 
Treasury bills over the period 1949-78 is less than 1 per-
cent. On stocks over the same period, this return is about 
7 percent.
1 These two facts have stimulated a lengthy dis-
cussion in the economics and finance literature, beginning 
with Mehra and Prescott 1985. The facts lead to the fol-
lowing natural questions: Did individuals anticipate these 
returns in making their consumption, saving, and portfolio 
decisions over the historical period? And will these aver-
age returns persist? 
If individuals did not anticipate these returns, then we 
would expect their future consumption, saving, and port-
folio behavior to change in light of these facts, thereby 
changing the average returns in the future. One possibility, 
for example, is that stocks have proved to be a lot more 
attractive compared to T-bills than people expected, there-
by driving people to try to switch their portfolios in favor 
of stocks and away from T-bills. We would expect the 
market result of such behavior to be a decrease in the re-
turn on stocks and an increase in the return on T-bills. 
Economists have attempted to explain the facts regard-
ing average returns on the assumption that these returns 
were anticipated, rather than unanticipated. One reason for 
this assumption is that it is hard to believe that people sys-
tematically misperceive the average returns over long pe-
riods of time. (This is basically a weak form of rational ex-
pectations.) Another reason for the assumption is that if 
we were to allow ourselves the freedom to attribute mis-
perceptions to people, then any observed pattern of aver-
age returns would be consistent with behavior. The view 
that the average returns were anticipated suggests that these 
returns will persist. 
Given that the returns were anticipated, a natural way 
to explain the facts regarding average returns is to appeal 
to the different risk characteristics of stocks and T-bills. 
Presumably, stocks have higher average returns than T-
bills in order to compensate the holders for bearing the ad-
ditional risk. The simplest model that captures this expla-
nation is the standard intertemporal model of asset pricing 
due to Lucas (1978). A key characteristic of this model is 
that it assumes complete frictionless markets. That is, in-
dividuals can buy and sell in all markets at given prices 
without being subject to borrowing or short-sales con-
straints and without incurring any transaction costs. 
This is, indeed, the approach Mehra and Prescott (1985) 
tried. However, they found it impossible to generate the 
observed average returns using this model. Reasonably pa-
rameterized versions of the model predicted too small an 
equity premium (the excess average return on stocks over 
•Isolated portions of this article are borrowed from an article in the Journal of 
Monetary Economics (June 1991, vol. 27, no. 3, pp. 311-31): "Asset Returns With 
Transactions Costs and Uninsured Individual Risk" by S. Rao Aiyagari and Mark 
Gertler, with the permission of Elsevier Science Publishers B. V. (North-Holland). © 
All rights reserved. 0304-3932/91/$03.50. 
1 These figures are from Labadie 1989, p. 289. The stock return refers to the return 
on Standard & Poor's 500 common stock price index (the S&P 500 index). 
17 the return on short-term T-bills) and too high a risk-free 
rate (the average real return on short-term T-bills).
2 The 
largest equity premium that Mehra and Prescott could gen-
erate from the model was 0.35 percent per year; the cor-
responding risk-free rate was about 4 percent per year. 
These results led Mehra and Prescott (1985, p. 145) to 
conclude that these return puzzles cannot be "accounted 
for by models that abstract from transactions costs, liquid-
ity constraints and other frictions absent in the Arrow-
Debreu set-up." 
A number of researchers have attempted to save the 
complete frictionless markets framework. (See, for exam-
ple, Epstein and Zin 1987; Nason 1988; Rietz 1988; 
Cecchetti, Lam, and Mark 1989; Labadie 1989; Weil 
1989; and Constantinides 1990.) Even though these ap-
proaches have met with some limited success, in my view 
they are unsatisfactory because they continue to rely on 
the complete frictionless markets approach. The thrust of 
this paper is that any model that relies on the complete 
frictionless markets approach is bound to be highly unsat-
isfactory for explaining a number of empirical observa-
tions concerning the behavior of individual consumptions, 
wealths, portfolios, and asset market transactions. In my 
view, it is not sensible to divorce an explanation of asset 
returns from these other facts. I will argue that deviating 
from the complete frictionless markets framework is, there-
fore, both necessary and fruitful for solving the return puz-
zles as well as explaining these other phenomena. One 
possible reason that researchers have stuck to the complete 
frictionless markets approach is the considerable ease of 
obtaining qualitative and quantitative predictions from 
such models. However, while the task of analyzing mod-
els with incomplete markets and transaction costs is much 
more difficult, it is not impossible. (See, for example, 
Aiyagari and Gertler 1991.) 
The plan of this article is as follows. I will first demon-
strate the failure of the standard complete frictionless mar-
kets model to account for the low risk-free rate and the 
large equity premium. Then I will detail the variety of oth-
er empirical failures of this model concerning individual 
consumptions, wealths, portfolios, and asset market trans-
actions. Then I will amend the standard model, by prohib-
iting some markets and introducing transaction costs, and 
explain how these amendments can move the model's pre-
dictions in the right directions: they lower the risk-free 
rate and enlarge the equity premium.
31 will also show that 
the amended model is qualitatively consistent with several 
other facts concerning individual consumptions, wealths, 
portfolios, and asset market transactions that are anomalies 
in the context of the standard complete frictionless mar-
kets model. I will conclude with some suggestions for fur-
ther work which I think will improve the match between 
theory and facts. 
A Failed Approach 
In this section, I give a simple exposition of the standard 
complete frictionless markets model's failure to explain 
the level of the risk-free rate and the size of the equity pre-
mium. The exposition will serve to point up various other 
failures of this model and also to suggest ways of amend-
ing the model to simultaneously address the return puzzles 
as well as the model's other failures. 
The Standard Model 
To begin the exposition, consider an economy with a large 
number (say, /) of individuals (indexed by i) who choose 
consumption over many periods and face uncertainty. 
• Uncertainty 
A convenient way of representing uncertainty is via the 
concept of states of the world. A state of the world at a 
particular date corresponds to one of the many possible 
events that may occur at that date. These might be events 
like, there will (or will not) be an oil embargo, a war will 
(or will not) break out in the Middle East, Russia will (or 
will not) suffer an economic collapse, nuclear fusion will 
(or will not) become practical, a particular individual will 
(or will not) become sick, and so on. I will focus attention 
on two successive dates, labeled 1 and 2, which should be 
thought of as representing a two-period segment of an 
ongoing economy. Assume that the state of the world is 
known at date 1 when decisions regarding consumption 
and asset trading are being made, but, of course, the state 
of the world at date 2 is uncertain. Let there be J possible 
states of the world at date 2 (indexed by j), and let 71be 
the probability that state j will occur (given the history of 
the world until and including date 1). 
• Preferences 
Let cn and ci2(j) be the consumptions of individual i at 
date 1 and at date 2 in state j. An individual's preferences 
2T-bills are only nominally risk free if they are held to maturity. To the extent that 
there is uncertainty regarding inflation, they are not risk free in real terms. However, 
over short periods of time, the inflation uncertainty is fairly small; therefore, we may 
regard short-term T-bills as essentially risk free in real terms as well. 
3TO see if this approach can fully solve the puzzles, of course, we must analyze 
the approach quantitatively as well as qualitatively. For a start on that sort of analysis, 
see Aiyagari and Gertler 1991. 
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over consumption at the two dates and in different states 
are represented by the following expression: 
(1) u,(cn) + E.V/feOMl+p) 
where [/,(•) represents the utility that the consumer gets 
from consumption and p is the utility discount rate. To get 
total utility from consumption at the two dates and in all 
possible states of the world, then, add the utility from con-
sumption at date 1 to the expected value of utility at date 
2 (given by the sum of the utility in each state times the 
probability of that state) discounted by the utility discount 
rate p. The utility discount rate embodies the assumption 
that each unit of utility at date 2 is worth only 1/(1+p) 
units at date 1. If p is positive (which is the natural 
assumption), this implies that the consumer is impatient 
since a consumer would rather have a unit of utility today 
than tomorrow. For this reason, p is also referred to as the 
rate of impatience or the rate of time preference. The total 
utility expression in (1) should, again, be thought of as 
representing the consumer's preferences over the two-peri-
od segment that we are considering. 
• Complete Markets 
I now introduce the concept of complete markets. Imagine 
that at date 1 the consumer can purchase claims to state j 
consumption in period 2 at the price q^ in terms of date 1 
consumption. As an example, the consumer might wish to 
purchase (at some price) claims to a certain number of 
gallons of gas at date 2 if there is a Middle East war and 
purchase (at a possibly different price) claims to a possi-
bly different number of gallons of gas at date 2 if there is 
no Middle East war. It is important to understand that the 
price is paid at date 1 and that what the consumer gets in 
return is a contingent claim; that is, the claim to a certain 
number of gallons of gas in the event of a Middle East 
war is fulfilled if and only if that event occurs. Markets 
are said to be complete if such markets exist for all possi-
ble events at date 2 and beyond. 
• Consumer Choice 
When such markets exist, it is very easy to partially char-
acterize the consumer's choice of consumptions at the two 
dates and in different states. This follows from the familiar 
principle of equalizing the ratio of marginal utilities be-
tween consumption at date 1 and consumption at date 2 
in some state j to the price of date 2 state j consumption. 
From (1) this leads to 
(2) 7C;Mf/.[cj2(y)]/[(l+p)M[/.(ca)] = qj 
where MU denotes marginal utility. Implicit in equation 
(2) is the assumption that everyone is free to buy as well 
as sell as many claims to date 2 consumption in state j as 
the individual can afford. That is, individuals do not face 
borrowing or short-sales constraints. Further, all claims are 
always fulfilled; that is, there is no default or bankruptcy. 
• Asset Returns 
I now show how the above framework allows for a very 
easy way to describe asset returns. 
Essentially, an asset at date 1 can be represented by its 
returns at date 2 (per unit of consumption at date 1) in 
each of the possible states.
4 Therefore, an asset may be 
described by {r-, j = 1,2,...,/}, where r- is the return on 
the asset at date 2 in state j. If the asset's return varies 
from state to state, it is a risky asset (like a stock). If its 
return is the same in every state, it is risk free (like a 
default-free bond). I will denote by r* the return on the 
risk-free asset at date 2 in every state j; the risk-free rate 
is defined to be r*. The risk premium on an asset is, then, 
given by the excess of the expected return on the asset 
compared to the risk-free rate, that is, by (Z;7y*;) - r*. 
Asset returns and contingent claim prices are related as 
follows: 
(3) 7/1+r.) = 1. 
The above relation arises from the following argument. A 
consumer can pay one unit of consumption at date 1 and 
acquire an asset that pays 1 + r- in state j at date 2. 
Alternatively, the consumer can purchase claims to 1 + r-
units of date 2 consumption in state j for each j. Either 
way, the consumer has the same pattern of consumption 
across states at date 2. The cost of the former option is the 
right side of (3). The cost of the latter option is the left 
side of (3). Therefore, in the absence of any transaction 
costs, borrowing, or short-sales constraints, the equality (3) 
must obtain.
5 
4Note that this description includes long-lived assets which may pay returns 
beyond date 2. In this case, I include in the asset's return at date 2 (in some state) the 
price at which it will sell. 
5 The reason for insisting on the absence of borrowing or short-sales constraints is 
the following. Suppose, to take an example, that ^^(l+r*) < 1. Then the consumer 
could borrow one unit of consumption and purchase claims to 1 + r* units of date 2 
consumption in every state. The consumer will have 1 - Zy<7y(l+r*) units of current 
consumption left over and still be able to pay off the loan at date 2 (from the proceeds 
19 • Risk Aversion 
I now introduce the concept of risk aversion. A consumer 
is risk averse if the individual prefers to receive a constant 
consumption c in each state j rather than to receive a pat-
tern of consumption {cjfj = 1,2,...,/} across states which 
has an expected value, given by ZjKjCj, equal to c. A con-
venient utility function which exhibits risk aversion is giv-
en by 
(4) U(c) = (c1" M)/(l-p) 
where p > 0 is known as the relative risk-aversion coef-
ficient.
6 If p is zero, then utility is linear in consumption 
and the consumer is indifferent between receiving c for 
sure and having a pattern of consumption across states 
with the expected value c. Both of these yield the same 
level of utility, and the consumer is said to be risk neutral. 
If p is positive, then the consumer always prefers the sure 
thing (since it yields higher utility) and is said to be risk 
averse. 
For this type of utility function, marginal utility is giv-
en by c'
v. Using this, we can rewrite (2) as follows: 
(5) nJ[cl2(j)/cnr^p) = qJ 
where p, is consumer /'s relative risk-aversion coefficient. 
As an example of applying these equations, suppose 
that an individual is risk neutral; that is, p, is zero for some 
i. It follows from (5) that qj = 7ty/(l+p). Plugging this into 
(3), we find that the expected return on every asset (and, 
hence, also the risk-free rate) must equal p. Risk premi-
ums are zero when someone is risk neutral. 
• A Representative Consumer 
A simple trick now allows us to do away with the large 
number of possibly heterogeneous consumers and replace 
them with a single representative consumer. Define 
(6) cl = (cn x c2l x c3l x ... x cn)
l/I 
(7) c2(j) = [cl2(J) x c22(j) x c32(j) x ... x cI2(j)]
l/I 
(8) 1/p = [(1/Pi) + (l/p2) + (1/M3) + + (%)]//. 
Note that c\ and c2(J) are the geometric means of indi-
vidual consumptions at date 1 and at date 2 in state j, re-
spectively. Therefore, we may think of these as per-capita 
consumptions. Further, p is the harmonic mean of the in-
dividual risk-aversion coefficients and represents a sort of 
average risk-aversion coefficient. It is easy to show that 
using (6)-(8) we can rewrite (5) in terms of these means, 
or averages, as follows: 
(9) [ci2(j)/cnY»i = [c2(j)lcxV = (1+p 
(10) T^O'VcJ-W+p) = qr 
Equations (10) and (3) show that as far as asset returns 
are concerned, we may as well imagine that the economy 
consists of a single representative agent who consumes the 
per-capita consumption in the economy and has a risk-
aversion coefficient p. 
From (10) we can obtain a fundamental equation relat-
ing the returns on assets to the growth rate of per-capita 
consumption. To do this, substitute for q- from (10) into 
(3) to get 
(11) Ey{^20'yqr/a+p)}(i+o) = i. 
Now note that Z-KJXJ, where X is any random variable 
taking the value XJ in state j, is simply the expected value 
of X, which I will denote by E(X). Letting Xj be (l+ry) x 
[c2(j)/c]]~
v, we can rewrite the above equation to obtain 
the following fundamental equation relating the returns on 
assets to the growth rate of per-capita consumption: 
(12) E[(\+r)(c2lcxy] = 1 + p. 
In (12), r is the possibly random return on an asset (say, 
stocks), and c2jcx is the possibly random gross growth rate 
in per-capita consumption. 
We can now see the factors that determine the level of 
the risk-free rate and the size of the risk premium. 
of contingent claims). That is, the consumer can make a pure arbitrage profit provided 
there is no restriction on borrowing. Similarly, if Z^Q+r*) > 1, the consumer can 
make a pure arbitrage profit provided there are no restrictions on short-selling contin-
gent claims. 
6This particular choice of the utility function is dictated by the facts concerning 
long-run growth. The facts are that over long periods of time, consumption of a typical 
individual and the real wage have grown at about the same rate, whereas individual 
hours worked has not changed much. If the utility function has the form c
nv(T-n), 
where T is individual time endowment and n is individual hours worked (so that T -
n is individual leisure time), then the behavior of consumption, hours worked, and the 
real wage will be consistent with the growth facts. To see this, note that the marginal 
condition for hours worked versus leisure implies that cv'(T-n)/[r\v (T-n)] = w, where 
w is the real wage. Clearly, this condition is consistent with c and w growing at a com-
mon rate while n does not change much. It turns out that the above utility function is 
the only one that is consistent with the growth facts. If we abstract from the choice of 
hours worked (which is not the focus of this article) by fixing n, then the resulting util-
ity function defined over individual consumption has the form assumed above. 
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• The Risk-Free Rate 
Applying (12) to the risk-free rate, we obtain 
(13) 1 + r* = {\+p)IE[(c2lcxVl 
We can now derive the following approximate formula 
for the risk-free rate using (13) and some simplifying as-
sumptions:
7 
(14) r* = p + ]ig - ]x
2c
2/2. 
In this formula, o is the standard deviation (S.D.) of per-
capita consumption growth and g is the average per-capita 
consumption growth. Clearly, r* depends on the value of 
p (positively), on the average growth rate of per-capita 
consumption (positively), on the variance in the growth 
rate of per-capita consumption (negatively), and on the 
risk-aversion coefficient (ambiguously). 
The reason for the positive dependence of r* on p is 
the following. For a given growth rate of per-capita con-
sumption, the higher is p (that is, the more heavily indi-
viduals discount the future), the greater is individuals' pref-
erence for current consumption over future consumption. 
Therefore, the interest rate must be higher to make people 
accept the given growth rate and not borrow to have more 
current consumption. 
The reason for the positive dependence of r* on the 
average growth rate of per-capita consumption is the fol-
lowing. For a given p, the higher is the growth rate of 
consumption, the higher is future consumption relative to 
current consumption. Therefore, the higher must the inter-
est rate be to prevent people from trying to borrow in order 
to convert future consumption into current consumption. 
The reason for the negative dependence of r* on the 
variance of per-capita consumption growth is the follow-
ing. When there is uncertainty regarding the future, indi-
viduals typically attempt to save more. This increases 
lending and lowers the interest rate. The effect of the risk-
aversion coefficient ju is ambiguous for the following rea-
son. For small values of p, the positive effect of the aver-
age per-capita consumption growth dominates the negative 
effect of the variance in per-capita consumption growth. 
Hence, higher values of ]x raise the risk-free rate. How-
ever, for large values of jli, the latter effect dominates. 
Consequently, higher values of jli lower the risk-free rate. 
• The Risk Premium 
Now we ask what factors determine the risk premium on 
a risky asset. Intuitively, we know that since consumers 
are risk averse, they prefer to avoid random variations in 
consumption. If an asset has a pattern of returns such that 
it yields high returns when consumption is high and low 
returns when consumption is low, then holding such an 
asset tends to exacerbate consumption variability relative 
to holding the risk-free asset, which yields the same re-
turns regardless of whether consumption is high or low. 
To compensate consumers for holding such an asset, its 
expected return has to be higher than the risk-free rate; 
that is, it must yield a positive risk premium. This same 
argument suggests that the risk premium on an asset need 
not be positive simply because its return is uncertain. In-
deed, if an asset yields a pattern of returns such that its 
return is high when consumption is low and its return is 
low when consumption is high, then holding such an asset 
mitigates consumption variability relative to holding the 
risk-free asset. Consumers are willing to hold such an as-
set even if its expected return is lower than the risk-free 
rate. That is, such an asset will have a negative risk pre-
mium. Therefore, what matters for determining the risk 
premium on an asset is how the pattern of returns covaries 
with consumption. In particular, even if an asset is risky, 
as long as the return on the asset is uncorrected with con-
sumption, its expected return must equal the risk-free rate. 
To see this point clearly, let X denote (c2/c1)"
p, and 
note that X is random since c2 is random. Further, let E(r) 
denote the expected return on the risky asset. Combining 
(12) and (13), we have 
(15) E(r) -r* = -cov(r,X)/E(X). 
Equation (15)
8 shows clearly that if an asset's return is 
positively correlated with consumption growth, so that 
cov(r,X) is negative, then the asset will command a posi-
tive risk premium. We can obtain a more useful expres-
sion for the risk premium which permits us to see the role 
of the risk-aversion coefficient by making some simplify-
ing assumptions and approximations. The expression is 
7Assume that ln(c2/c,) = g + e, where e is a normally distributed random variable 
with mean zero and variance a
2 and g is average per-capita consumption growth. With 




 Note that In(c2/cj) = (c2/c,) - 1, 
which is the growth rate in per-capita consumption. Also, approximate ln(l+r*) and 
ln(l+p) by r* and p, respectively. The simplification is obtained by taking logs of both 
sides in (13) and using the above approximations and results. 
8TO see that equation (15) results from the combination of (12) and (13), note that 




(16) E(r) -r* = pcov[ln(l+r),ln(c2/c1)]. 
This expression shows clearly that the magnitude of the 
risk premium on an asset depends positively on the coeffi-
cient of relative risk aversion and on how strongly the re-
turn on the asset covaries with consumption growth. 
The Model Faces the Facts 
We can now use equations (14) and (16) to understand 
why the empirically observed level of the risk-free rate 
and size of the equity premium are puzzling in light of the 
complete frictionless markets theory of the determination 
of asset returns described above. 
Let's start with the risk-free rate. The growth rate of 
U.S. per-capita consumption (services plus nondurables) 
has averaged about 1.7 percent annually during 1950-88 
with standard deviation equal to 0.0124. Empirically plau-
sible values of \i are typically around 2 and seldom greater 
than 10. Estimated values of p are in a range from 1 to 5 
percent annually. Plugging these numbers into (14) shows 
that the annual risk-free rate ought to be at least 4.4 per-
cent and possibly well over 10 percent. In fact, the annual 
risk-free rate is close to zero. 
With regard to the equity premium, the magnitude of 
cov[ln(l+r),ln(c2/c1)] is always less than S.D.[ln(l+r)] x 
S.D.fln^/Cj)]. The standard deviation of stock returns has 
been about 7 percent annually over the postwar period.
1
0 
As noted in the previous paragraph, the standard deviation 
of per-capita consumption growth has been about 0.0124. 
Plugging these numbers into (16) and using a value of 2 
for the risk-aversion coefficient, we find that the predicted 
equity premium is about 0.17 percent. Even if we use a 
risk-aversion coefficient of 10, our predicted equity premi-
um is still only about 0.85 percent annually. In fact, the 
observed equity premium is about 6 percent annually. 
An alternative way to pose the return puzzles is to ask 
what value of ]i would make the theoretical predictions 
match the facts. It turns out that typically the required val-
ues of ju are very large. To get the risk-free rate to be ze-
ro, we would need a value for p of about 240.
1
1
 To get 
the equity premium to be 6 percent, we would need a val-
ue for greater than 70. It seems very unlikely that con-
sumers are so extremely risk averse. To get a feel for the 
degree of risk aversion involved, one can calculate that a 
consumer with a relative risk-aversion coefficient of 100 
would prefer to take one unit of consumption for sure 
rather than face a lottery involving a 40 percent chance of 
getting 0.99 units of consumption and a 60 percent chance 
of getting 1 million units of consumption. 
Yet another way to pose the return puzzles is to ask 
what the mean and the variance of the per-capita consump-
tion growth rate would have to be to match the observed 
level of the risk-free rate and size of the equity premium. 
(See Hansen and Jagannathan 1991.) The resulting num-
bers turn out to be grossly counterfactual. 
Related Failures 
Now I will detail many other empirical failures of the com-
plete frictionless markets model. I will show that all of 
these empirical failures are related to this model's implica-
tion that individual consumptions move too closely with 
each other and with per-capita consumption. In the fol-
lowing section, I will show that introducing market in-
completeness will avoid this implication and lead to a low-
er risk-free rate, introducing transaction costs will enlarge 
the equity premium, and adding both of these features will 
lead to better predictions for a variety of other facts. 
The Model's Other Predictions . . . 
I will describe the following predictions of the complete 
frictionless markets theory: 
• Individual consumptions ought to be perfectly corre-
lated with each other and with per-capita consump-
tion. 
• Each individual's consumption ought to fluctuate as 
much as anyone else's and as much as per-capita con-
sumption. 
• An individual's position in society's wealth distribu-
tion should not vary much over time or across states 
of the world. 
9TO obtain (16), let 1 + r = [1 + £(R)]exp[« - CJ
2(W)/2], where u is normally dis-
tributed with mean zero and variance o \u). Using the previous assumption regarding 
ln(c2/c,), we can write 
(\+r*)E(X) = E[(l+r)X] 
= [1 + E(r)]E{exp[u - o\u)/2 - pg - pe]} 
= [1 + £(r)]exp[-|jg + ]li
2cj
2/2
 - pcov(w ,e)] 
= [1 + E(r)]E(X )exp[-pcov(w ,e)]. 
Canceling E(X) from both sides, taking logs, and using the approximation ln(l+z) = 
z for small z, we obtain equation (16). 
10This figure is calculated from the tables in Labadie 1989, p. 289, for the annual 
real return on the S&P 500 index during 1949-78. 
1 'Note that very large values of \i will reduce the risk-free rate because of the neg-
ative effect of the term -p
2a
2/2.
 See equation (14). 
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• Every individual must hold at least some amount of 
risky assets which have expected returns higher than 
the risk-free rate. 
• Individuals have no need to engage in trading in asset 
markets, and any pattern of transaction volumes and 
transaction velocities among various securities is con-
sistent with the theory. 
To see the above implications of the theory, I repeat 
equation (9) here: 
d7) [cl2u)/cnri = [c2u)/cir = (i+P^/tc,. 
It can be seen from the above equation that all individ-
uals' date 2 consumptions move up or down together in 
step with date 2 per-capita consumption. If c2(j) is higher 
than c2(k), where j and k are any two possible states of the 
world, then ci2(j) is higher than ci2(k) for all individuals 
i. Therefore, individual consumption growth rates must be 
perfectly correlated with each other as well as with the 
per-capita consumption growth rate. 
Equation (17) also implies that if the risk-aversion co-
efficients (the p/s) are not too different across individuals, 
then each individual's consumption growth fluctuates as 
much as anyone else's and as much as per-capita con-
sumption growth. As an example, an oil embargo must af-
fect each individual's consumption in the same way and 
to the same extent as it does per-capita consumption. Fur-
ther, events which affect an individual's personal circum-
stances (like health and employment) but have a negligi-
ble impact on per-capita consumption must also have a 
negligible impact on that individual's consumption. The 
reason is that the individual would have purchased claims 
to consumption in the event of a loss of health or employ-
ment in order to lessen the risk of consumption loss, and 
other individuals (who are not affected by the change in 
this individual's health or employment) would have sold 
such claims and shared a little bit of the risk. 
Yet another implication of (17) is (again assuming that 
the risk-aversion coefficients are not too dissimilar) that 
there cannot be any rags-to-riches or riches-to-rags kinds 
of stories of individual fortunes or misfortunes. If an indi-
vidual has higher consumption today than another individ-
ual, then the first individual will have higher consumption 
tomorrow (whatever the state of the world) than the sec-
ond individual. Consequently, an individual who has high-
er wealth today than another individual will have higher 
wealth tomorrow (regardless of the state of the world) than 
the other individual. An individual's position in society's 
wealth distribution remains frozen over time and across 
states of the world. 
Another implication of the complete frictionless mar-
kets theory is that every individual will hold at least some 
amounts of risky assets which have expected returns that 
are favorable, or exceed the risk-free rate. (This, by the 
way, is known as Arrow's theorem.) To understand this 
implication, consider an individual whose entire wealth 
(including human wealth) is currently held in the form of 
the risk-free asset. As a consequence, this person's sec-
ond-period consumption is completely risk free; that is, 
ci2(j) is independent of j. Now consider the impact on the 
person's total utility if the individual were to purchase a 
small amount of the risky asset. This impact is given by 
(18) -MUfc^) + MUfo^Kjil+rpKl+p). 
The first term here is the loss in utility from reduced cur-
rent consumption (due to the amount spent in purchasing 
the risky asset), and the second-term is the gain in utility 
from increased second-period consumption. The gain con-
sists of the sum of the increases in second-period con-
sumption in each state (which is 1 +r; in state j) times the 
probability of occurrence of each state, weighted by the 
marginal utility of date 2 consumption (which is indepen-
dent of the state) and discounted by the rate of time pref-
erence p. The gain in total utility can be rewritten as 
(19) MUt(ca) [-1 + 5^7C.(l+r.)/(l+r*)] 
since 
(20) 1 + r* = (1+p )MUi(cil)/MUi(ci2). 
Now note that the gain in total utility must be positive 
since, by assumption, the expected return on the risky as-
set exceeds the risk-free rate. Hence, the individual ought 
to be willing to purchase at least a small amount of the 
risky asset. In fact, if individual risk-aversion coefficients 
are not too different, then all individuals should hold ap-
proximately the same portfolios except for scale. That is, 
the proportions of wealth held in each asset must be rough-
ly the same for all individuals since they all have roughly 
similar attitudes toward risk. 
Yet another implication of the complete frictionless 
markets theory is that there is no need for individuals to 
engage in asset trading. As an example, there is nothing 
to gain from having a stock market in which individuals 
23 can buy and sell shares of stocks. Instead, individuals can 
simply hold on to their stock portfolio, receive the divi-
dends, and buy or sell the appropriate amounts of various 
contingent claims to achieve the desired pattern of con-
sumption over time and across states of the world. Conse-
quently, the theory offers no explanation either for the spe-
cific volumes of trading in various asset markets or for the 
specific pattern of transaction velocities (turnover rates) of 
different types of assets. 
... vs. The Facts 
Even casual observation suggests that every one of the 
above implications is grossly counterfactual. Casual em-
piricism as well as formal evidence indicates that individ-
ual consumptions are much more variable than aggregate 
consumption (Barsky, Mankiw, and Zeldes 1986 and 
Deaton 1991); further, individual consumptions are not 
very highly correlated, either with each other or with ag-
gregate consumption. Individual specific circumstances ap-
pear to affect individual consumptions far more than is 
suggested by the theory. 
The following evidence, described by Carroll (1991), 
indicates that individual wealth holdings are highly vola-
tile. According to Avery and Kennickell (1989), 60 per-
cent of U.S. households were in a different wealth decile 
in 1985 than in 1982. Approximately 30 percent moved 
up, and 30 percent moved down. Only people in the top-
most and the bottommost deciles were more likely to stay 
put than to move to another decile. It would be hard to 
explain the movement of large fractions of households 
across the wealth distribution over such a short period of 
time (suggesting that the movement is not due to age and 
life cycle-related factors) if markets were complete and 
operated without frictions. Avery et al. (1984) present evi-
dence to the effect that in the United States the ratio of 
median wealth to median income is higher for individuals 
in occupations with greater income uncertainty, for exam-
ple, farmers and the self-employed. This suggests that the 
risks of such occupations are not being shared as the the-
ory suggests. 
Mankiw and Zeldes (1991) present evidence to the ef-
fect that only about 25 percent of U.S. households own 
any stocks. This seems to be in striking contrast to the the-
ory's prediction that all individuals would hold at least 
some amount of stocks since the expected return on stocks 
is so much higher than the risk-free rate. 
Further evidence reveals similar contradictions between 
the theory and the evidence concerning portfolios. Ac-
cording to evidence presented by Avery, Elliehausen, and 
Kennickell (1988), the ownership of stocks is highly con-
centrated at the top end of the wealth distribution, whereas 
the ownership of liquid assets is concentrated at the bot-
tom end. They say, for example, that in 1963 the top 1 
percent of U.S. wealth holders owned about 60 percent of 
all equity but only about 10 percent of all liquid assets. 
In contrast, the bottom 90 percent of households owned 
about 53 percent of all liquid assets and only about 9 per-
cent of all equity. Greenwood (1983, pp. 34-35) presents 
similar evidence: in 1973 the top 5 percent of U.S. wealth 
holders owned about 85 percent of all corporate stocks 
and about 60 percent of all debt instruments. Finally, 
Kessler and Wolff (1991, p. 263) report that in the United 
States in 1983, the lowest wealth quintile's portfolio was 
over 80 percent liquid assets (currency, demand deposits, 
and time deposits), only about 9 percent financial securi-
ties and corporate stocks, and only about 3 percent other 
real estate (that is, not including housing) and unincorpo-
rated business. In contrast, the highest wealth quintile's 
portfolio was only about 15 percent liquid assets, about 22 
percent financial securities and corporate stocks, and over 
42 percent other real estate and unincorporated business. 
Lastly, the vast amount of trading that takes place daily 
in stock markets and other financial markets would appear 
to be difficult to reconcile with the theory. In addition, 
there is a specific pattern to turnover rates among different 
types of assets; liquid assets (like savings and money mar-
ket accounts) generally have much higher turnover rates 
than less liquid assets like stocks.
1
2
 This fact suggests that 
transaction costs involved in borrowing and trading stocks 
are likely quite important.
1
3 
12According to Aiyagari and Gertler (1991), the ratio of shares sold over a year 
to the average number of shares listed for the year is about 0.5. Further, a substantial 
fraction of the volume is accounted for by institutional traders, which own about half 
of the outstanding shares. Turnover by households, who own the other half, is negligi-
ble. As a comparison, the equivalent turnover statistic is about 3 for savings accounts 
and about 7 for bank money market funds, indicating a substantially higher transaction 
velocity. 
13Aiyagari and Gertler (1991) mention three basic kinds of (pretax) costs involved 
in trading stocks: brokerage commission costs, buy/sell spreads, and time involved in 
acquiring knowledge and in record keeping. At a deeper level, the existence of these 
costs reflects the informational frictions involved in trading heterogeneous assets like 
stocks. In addition, tax considerations are likely to be a factor since capital gains levies 
are based on realization rather than accrual. Restrictions on borrowing and short-selling 
are ubiquitous. The borrowing rate typically exceeds the lending rate substantially, and 
individuals are typically unable to borrow much against future earnings. For example, 
in the United States, the historical difference between the credit card rate and the risk-
free rate is larger than 8 percent. Borrowing to buy stocks is subject to limits and mar-
gin requirements. See Aiyagari and Gertler 1991 for a detailed discussion of these 
costs. 
24 S. Rao Aiyagari 
Financial Market Facts 
A Better Approach 
Having thus far argued that the complete frictionless mar-
kets model fails not only in explaining asset returns but 
also in explaining individual consumptions, wealths, port-
folios, and asset market transactions, I will now make two 
amendments to the simple standard model: prohibit some 
markets and introduce transaction costs. First I will ex-
plain the intuition behind how introducing these features 
might solve the equity premium and risk-free rate puzzles. 
Then I will describe how these same features can also 
successfully overturn several of the other empirical fail-
ures of the complete frictionless markets model. In doing 
so, I will be showing how departing from the complete 
frictionless markets framework provides a superior expla-
nation not only of asset returns but also of a variety of oth-
er phenomena. 
Overview 
In my amended model, individuals face idiosyncratic 
shocks to labor income. I assume that markets for claims 
on labor income do not exist. This assumption implies that 
individuals must self-insure, that is, buy and sell assets to 
smooth consumption. The model has two kinds of secu-
rities: stocks and short-term government bonds (T-bills). 
A key distinction between the two is that, by assumption, 
stocks are costly to trade while T-bills are not. T-bills can 
be thought of either as being directly held by households 
or as being costlessly repackaged by an intermediary 
which in turn issues costlessly tradable securities to its de-
positors. In the model, however, stocks cannot be repack-
aged. Regardless of whether T-bills are directly or indi-
rectly held by households, in the model these bonds have 
an edge over stocks as a vehicle for self-insurance. 
Introducing nontraded individual income risks lets the 
model generate a low risk-free rate—in equilibrium, a risk-
free rate potentially well below the rate that would prevail 
with complete frictionless markets. Similarly, introducing 
costs of trading stocks along with uninsured individual 
risks lets the model enlarge the equity premium. Individ-
uals trade in securities because of the need for self-insur-
ance. In equilibrium, therefore, costs of trading become 
relevant to pricing securities. And since exchanging T-bills 
is costless, stocks must pay an added premium—a transac-
tion/liquidity premium—to be competitive. 
An Amended Model With Incomplete Markets . . . 
Consider a simple world in which a large number of infi-




 Let i index an individual and t denote 
time (taking values 0,1,2,...), and use y\ and c\ to denote 
an individual's time t labor income and consumption, re-
spectively. Each person i has preferences over consump-
tion given by 
(2D £0{ £;>'(/(<)} 
for (5 = 1/(1+p) and p > 0, where we continue to assume 
that the utility function U(c) is of the form (c
1_M-l)/(l-p). 
Suppose that labor income is random and is uncorre-
cted across individuals. Therefore, per-capita labor income 
(which equals per-capita consumption) is certain, while in-
dividual labor income is random. Let yt denote per-capita 
labor income, and suppose that it grows at the constant 
rate g over time and that an individual's share in per-cap-
ita income, denoted 6J (= y
lt/yt), follows a stationary Mar-
kov process over time. Note that, as a consequence, an in-
dividual's income grows at the average rate g. 
Since individual labor income is risky, individuals 
would like to purchase insurance against the possibility of 
receiving low labor income. One way to organize such an 
insurance market would be for individuals to pay a premi-
um of yt - yt each period, where yt is the maximum possi-
ble labor income in period t, and receive an insurance 
payment of yt - y\ if their labor income is y\. Note that 




 An individual's labor income, after 
the premium is paid and the insurance payment received, 
is always equal to per-capita labor income yr 
Now suppose that such insurance markets do not exist. 
Instead, restrict individuals to trade only via credit markets 
in which they can borrow (up to some preestablished 
credit limit) or lend at a fixed interest rate. Also assume 
that the government has outstanding an amount of T-bills 
which is a constant proportion of per-capita income, that 
the T-bills are costlessly intermediated by money market 
mutual funds, and that individuals can hold money market 
accounts. Assume that government consumption is zero 
and that interest payments on T-bills are financed by a 
lump-sum tax which is a constant proportion of per-capita 
income and is identical across individuals. 
14This is a slightly modified version of the model that was used in Aiyagari and 
Gertler 1991. 
15This simplified insurance arrangement is equivalent to one in which individuals 
buy and sell claims contingent on the labor income realizations of all individuals in the 
economy. 
25 The budget constraint that an individual faces is given 







lt+l > -kyt 
(24) c\> 0 
where a\ denotes liquid asset (money market account) 
holdings, T is the ratio of taxes to per-capita income, and 
kyt is the credit limit. (Since an individual's income is 
growing at the average rate g, it seems reasonable to let 
the credit limit increase with income.) It is convenient to 
rewrite the individual budget constraint in terms of c\ (= 
c
lJyt) and a!t+x (= a
lt+l/yt) by dividing equations (22)-{24) 
by yt as follows: 
(25) cj + ^^ej + a+r^/a+g)-! 
(26) d\+l>-k 
(27) c\ > 0. 
The government budget constraint can be written as 
follows: 
(28) (r-g)b/(l+g) = T 




 In equilibrium, the ratio of liquid assets 
held (net of borrowing) to per-capita income must equal 
b, the ratio of T-bills to per-capita income. 
• Lowering the Risk-Free Rate 
If complete frictionless insurance markets existed, each in-
dividual's labor income would be the same as per-capita 
labor income and, consequently, each individual's con-
sumption would have to be constant across states of the 
world and equal per-capita consumption. [See equation 
(17) and the ensuing discussion.] Consequently, the risk-
free rate would have to equal p + jug since per-capita con-




with only credit markets, the return would have to be less 
than this. The reason is as follows. 
With only credit markets, an individual can try to 
smooth consumption over time, that is, achieve the same 
average consumption next period as today by borrowing 
if today's income is low or lending if today's income is 
high. Note that since the shocks are idiosyncratic, if some-
one receives low income today (and needs to borrow), 
then someone else receives high income today (and wants 
to lend). But it would not be possible to smooth consump-
tion across different states of the world tomorrow. This is 
because lending yields a fixed return tomorrow regardless 
of whether tomorrow's income is high or low. However, 
in an economy like the one above that goes on for many 
periods, one can borrow again (or lend again) when to-
morrow comes if one's income turns out to be low (or 
high). This way, by repeatedly borrowing and lending, 
one can try to achieve smooth consumption across time as 
well as across states of the world. 
Note that even if borrowing were prohibited (so that 
the credit limit k were zero), one could achieve some de-
gree of smoothness in consumption by building up or run-
ning down holdings of liquid assets. The larger the aver-
age amount of liquid assets held, the greater is the individ-
ual's ability to maintain smooth consumption in the face 
of fluctuating income. Such holdings of liquid assets are 
referred to as precautionary holdings since they are moti-
vated by a desire to prevent the individual from suffering 
reduced consumption from a long series of low income re-
alizations. Saving in order to build up such precautionary 
holdings of liquid assets is referred to as precautionary 
saving. 
To simplify matters, suppose that the credit limit is 
zero, so that there is no borrowing. In the absence of in-
come uncertainty, an individual would not hold any liquid 
assets if the return were less than p + \ig. This is because 
the individual would like to borrow, and since this is not 
allowed, he or she would simply run down holdings of 
liquid assets to zero.
1
9
 However, if there is uncertainty in 
the individual's income, then this would not be sensible. 
16This can be derived as follows: Let Bt be the total amount of T-bills outstanding. 
Then the government budget constraint is B,(l+r) = xy, + Bt+V Dividing this equation 
throughout by y,, letting BJyt_x = Bt+x/yt = b, and recalling that y,/y,_i = 1 + g, we 
obtain (28). 
17Recall that equation (14) is an approximation derived from (13). The exact 
formula for the risk-free rate (in the absence of any randomness in consumption) is giv-
en by 1 +r = (l+p)(l+g)
M. 
18The common expression saving for a rainy day captures the essence of precau-
tionary saving. The studies that contain analyses of models of precautionary saving with 
borrowing constraints include Schechtman and Escudero 1977; Bewley undated, 1984; 
and Clarida 1987, 1990. See Aiyagari 1992 for an exposition of such models and more 
extensive references. 
19From (13) one can see that if borrowing is permitted and r is less than p + pg, 
then c2/cx must be less than 1 + g. That is, individual consumption must grow slower 
than income. By borrowing, the individual increases current consumption at the ex-
pense of future consumption, thus lowering consumption growth. 
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The individual would maintain some positive holdings of 
liquid assets in order to serve as a buffer against low in-
come realizations. The higher the return on the assets, the 
larger is the average holding of liquid assets (relative to 
per-capita income). 
This relationship is depicted in the accompanying chart 
by the curve labeled a(r). The most important feature of 
this curve is that average liquid asset holdings tend to in-
finity as the risk-free rate approaches p + pg from below. 
The reason for this is twofold. First, since there is always 
a probability (however small) of receiving a long string of 
low income realizations, it would not be possible to main-
tain a smooth consumption profile unless the individual 
had an infinite amount of liquid assets. Second, it is cost-
less (at the margin) for the individual to acquire an addi-
tional unit of liquid assets. The loss in current utility, giv-
en by MU, is balanced by the expected discounted gain, 





 These two factors lead the consumer to acquire a 
large amount of assets to maintain smooth consumption 
when r = p + ]Lig. 
The relation between the interest rate and the supply of 
liquid assets is also shown in the chart, by the curve la-
beled b(r). This relation is derived from the government 
budget constraint (28), which can be rewritten as 
(29) b(r) = T(\+g)/(r-g). 
In a steady-state equilibrium, the ratio of liquid assets 
to per-capita income that individuals desire to hold (net of 
borrowing) must equal the ratio of liquid assets to per-cap-
ita income supplied. As can be seen in the chart, the equi-
librium risk-free rate, r*, is below p + \ig. The precaution-
ary saving motive makes it desirable for individuals to 
maintain holdings of liquid assets even if the risk-free rate 
is below p + ]ig, whereas in the absence of income uncer-
tainty (and, hence, a precautionary motive), individuals 
would not hold any liquid assets if the risk-free rate were 
below p + jug.
2
1
 Thus, incomplete markets lower the risk-
free rate via the precautionary motive. 
What factors influence the amount of liquid assets held 
and the level of the risk-free rate? The greater the degree 
of income uncertainty, the larger the amount of liquid as-
sets an individual needs to hold in order to provide a buff-
er. If income uncertainty increases, the a{r) curve will 
shift to the right, thereby lowering the risk-free rate and 
increasing liquid asset holdings. If individuals are permit-
ted to borrow up to some limit, then they will reduce their 
The Market for Liquid Assetsf 
Risk-Free 
Rate of Return 
Quantity 
t Recall that a security's return varies inversely with its price; that's why the 
demand and supply curves slope as they do. 
liquid asset holdings. This is because they need not hold 
as large an amount of liquid assets since they can always 
borrow when they run out of liquid assets and receive low 
income realizations. In this case, the a(r) curve will shift 
to the left, raising the risk-free rate and reducing liquid as-
set holdings. 
To see that the precautionary motive can potentially 
lower the risk-free rate significantly, recall equation (14) 
in which we now interpret a as the standard deviation of 
individual consumption growth rather than that of per-
capita consumption growth. Because of incomplete mar-
kets, individual consumption growth can be considerably 
more volatile than per-capita consumption growth, and 
this greater volatility can lower the risk-free rate signifi-
cantly. As an example, suppose that jli is 4 and a is 0.1, so 
20This follows from the fact that our choice of the utility function implies that 
MU is given by c~
p and that individual consumption will grow at the same rate g as 
per-capita consumption if the individual is able to smooth consumption across states. 
See equation (21) and the discussion below. 
2'it follows that with complete markets, the steady-state equilibrium would be 
represented by the point C in the chart. There the risk-free rate equals p + pg, and the 
amount of liquid assets held relative to per-capita income equals x(l+g)/(p+pg-g) and, 
hence, is determined entirely by government policy without regard to the extent of 
uncertainty in individual incomes. 
27 that individual consumption growth is about eight times 
more variable than per-capita consumption growth. It is 
easy to calculate that the last term in (14) can lead to a 
drop in the risk-free rate of about 8 percent. 
. . . And With Transaction Costs 
Now consider what would happen if we introduced anoth-
er type of asset (stocks) into this economy. Suppose that 
there exist s capital machines which costlessly produce 
output each period. The proceeds are distributed as divi-
dends to shareholders who own the machines. There are 
s equity claims, which are tradable and perfectly divisible. 
One claim entitles the owner to l/s percent of the total 
output from all the machines each period. Assume that the 




Assume that the costs of trading stocks are proportional 
to the value of the trade.
2
3
 Let ah be the per-unit-of-value 
buying cost and as the per-unit-of-value selling cost. An 
individual /'s budget constraint is, then, modified to the 
following: 
(30) + + 
= yj + s\dyt + (\+r)a\ - %yt 
- mm[abp£s\+rs\\asp£s\-sll)] 
where pt is the price of equity. Short sales of stocks are 
not allowed, so that s\ > 0. The return to stocks rs is de-
fined as follows: 
(31) 1 +rs = (dt+l+pt+l)/pr 
• Enlarging the Equity Premium 
In the absence of transaction costs, the return on stocks 
must equal the risk-free rate since stocks are also risk free. 
To see the role that transaction costs play in generating a 
spread between the returns to equity and liquid assets, 
consider an individual's decision whether to buy or sell 
stocks. There will be two levels of income, denoted yb{s,a) 
and ys(s,a), with 0 < ys(s,a) < yb(s,a), such that the individ-
ual sells stocks whenever income is below ys, holds stocks 
when it is between ys and yh, and buys stocks when it is 
above yh. Notice that, in general, these regions will depend 
on the individual's initial holdings of stocks and liquid as-
sets, 5 and a, respectively. 
Arbitrage requires that any individual buying both 
stocks and bonds at time t must be indifferent between ac-
quiring either kind of asset at the margin. Therefore, for 
each person i in this position at t, the following Euler con-
ditions must hold (where the i superscripts for agents are 
dropped for convenience): 
(32) MU=$(l+r)E(MU') 
(33) (l+ocb)PtMU 
= PUV,+1 + (l+ocb)Pt+]\Eb(MU') 
+ n
s[dt+l + (\-as)Pt,x]Es{MU0 
+ n




h are the probabilities the individual 
will be buying, selling, or holding stocks next period; 
Eh, Es, and Eh are the expectations conditional on buying, 
selling, or holding stocks next period; MU and MU' are 




 and the number Xh satisfies 
(34) ab>\> -as. 
The left side of equation (33) is the cost of buying 
stocks, and the right side is the expected marginal gain, 
after factoring in transaction costs. Note that the marginal 
gain depends on whether and how the individual will be 
adjusting his or her stock holdings in the subsequent peri-
od. The marginal value of stocks in the subsequent period 
is (1+ab)pt+l for someone who is buying stocks, and it is 
(l-as)pt+l for someone who is selling. For someone hold-
ing, it lies between the buying and the selling price, at (1-h 
Xh)p[+l. (In general, Xh will depend on whether the individ-
ual expects to be buying or selling down the road.) Every-
thing else equal, the larger is n
s, the smaller is the expect-
ed marginal benefit from purchasing stocks. The unattrac-
tive aspect of turning around and selling the stocks in the 
subsequent period is having to incur the transaction cost. 
In a steady-state equilibrium, pt will be proportional to 
total dividends and, hence, to per-capita income. There-
fore, pt+i/pt will equal 1 + g. Dividing through equation 
(33) by pt and using (31), we can express (33) in the fol-
lowing form: 
22I have abstracted from dividend uncertainty so that we can isolate the impact of 
the frictions we have introduced. Since there is no dividend risk, any spread between 
the returns on stocks and bonds is due only to the transaction costs operating in con-
junction with the uninsured individual income risk. 
23Proportional as well as fixed costs are considered in Aiyagari and Gertler 1991. 
24Note that the Euler conditions for agents who are selling stocks or who are 
subject to borrowing or short-sale constraints will be different from (32) and (33). 
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= p{(l +rs)E(MW) 
+ at(l+g)[£(WC/
/)-^(Aft/01 
= p£(Mf/0[l+rJ + a,(l+g) 
x EJ(Aff/')/£(Aft/')]-
Substituting for Mt/ from (32) into (35) and rearranging, 




Quite clearly, the transaction costs are responsible for 




spread is increasing in ah, as, and n
s. Further, it is likely 
to be larger the more risk averse the individual; this is 
because sales of stocks are likely when consumption is 
low, which makes the utility measure of the transaction 
costs of selling (relatively) high. The lower bound for the 
spread equals n Xah+as), the probability of selling times 
the round-trip transaction cost
2
6
 This value arises (approx-
imately) when individuals are risk neutral and when the 
shadow value of stocks for someone holding stocks is ar-
bitrarily close to its upper bound, (1+ocb)p. 
In summary, the incompleteness of markets for insur-
ance implies a lower risk-free rate of interest compared to 
that in the complete frictionless markets case. Further, the 
existence of trading costs for stocks in conjunction with 
the need to trade securities to smooth consumption can in-
troduce a spread between the returns to stocks and bonds. 
In this way, the combination of incomplete markets and 
transaction costs can potentially provide an explanation for 
the low risk-free rate and the large equity premium. 
Related Successes 
I will now show that the combination of these features can 
also account qualitatively for the behavior of individual 
consumptions, wealths, and portfolios and the pattern of 
transactions in asset markets. 
The incompleteness of markets makes individual con-
sumptions imperfectly correlated with each other as well 
as with aggregate consumption. This occurs because in-
dividuals who receive high labor income will be increas-
ing their consumption and adding to their asset holdings 
whereas individuals who receive low labor income will be 




 Also, obviously, individual consumptions 
can fluctuate considerably more than aggregate consump-
tion since individual consumptions respond to individual-
specific circumstances that have no impact on aggregate 
consumption. 
In addition, the incompleteness of markets leads to di-
versity among individuals in total wealth as well as in 
portfolios. An individual who has had a run of high labor 
income will have high wealth and enjoy high consump-
tion compared to another individual who has suffered a 
run of bad luck. As a consequence, there is considerable 
mobility of individuals across the wealth and income dis-
tributions. 
Individuals with high wealth are likely to hold relative-
ly more stocks in their portfolios than individuals with 
low wealth since the former have a greater ability to cush-
25Note that the first term on the right side of (36) is an order of magnitude smaller 
than the other terms in the expression since it is a product of two small terms, the dif-
ference between the risk-free rate and the growth rate and the transaction cost incurred 
in buying stocks. Therefore, it is safe to neglect this term in the following discussion. 
25me argument presumes that ES(MU') > E(MU')', that is, marginal utility con-
ditional on selling is at least as high as unconditional marginal utility, based on the idea 
that sales occur when consumption is low. Note that K
s is the probability next period 
of selling the marginal unit of the stocks purchased this period, as opposed to selling 
all the stocks purchased this period. Note also that n
s will vary across individuals 
depending on their portfolios. 
27Note that in the present model in which there is no uncertainty in aggregate labor 
income, individual consumptions will be uncorrelated with each other since the shocks 
to labor income are idiosyncratic, that is, uncorrelated across individuals. If we also 
introduce some randomness in aggregate labor income, then individual consumptions 
will tend to move together with aggregate consumption whenever there is a shock to 
aggregate labor income. Thus, the combination of idiosyncratic and aggregate shocks 
will make individual consumptions positively, but less than perfectly, correlated with 
each other as well as with aggregate consumption. 
29 ion their consumption in the event of low labor income by 
selling off liquid assets without incurring transaction costs. 
Moreover, the turnover rate for liquid assets will be 
higher than that for stocks. Since the return on stocks is 
higher and trading stocks is subject to costs, the individual 
will engage in stock trading only as a last resort and will 
try for the most part to smooth consumption by buying 




The basic model with incomplete markets and transaction 
costs outlined in this article could be extended in several 
obvious ways to try to further lower the risk-free rate and 
enlarge the equity premium. 
One of these extensions is to allow for additional heter-




 This can be mod-
eled as arising from either differential proportional costs 




 The group of agents facing low costs 
will likely have portfolios consisting mostly of stocks, 
whereas the other group facing high costs will likely have 
portfolios consisting mostly of liquid assets. This feature 
will likely enlarge the equity premium arising from the 
model since the group that would like to hold more stocks 
due to the higher return faces high costs of participating 
in or trading in the stock market. 
Another possible extension is to include a transaction 
motive for holding liquid assets in addition to precaution-
ary considerations. Certainly a component of household 
holdings of savings and money market accounts stems 
from transaction needs. By enhancing the demand for liq-
uid assets, this feature is likely to lower the risk-free rate 
arising from the model. 
An implication of the incomplete markets and transac-
tion cost model described in this article is that a reduction 
in transaction costs ought to shrink the equity premium. 
Many dramatic changes have occurred in financial mar-
kets in the United States and abroad over the last 15 years 
due to improvements in technology (especially in commu-
nication) and loosening of regulations. Many of these 
changes have resulted in lower costs of transacting in fi-
nancial markets. An empirical investigation of whether 
these changes have resulted in a smaller equity premium 
seems worthwhile. 
It would also be interesting to explicitly study the rea-
sons for the absence of markets. In my incomplete mar-
kets model with transaction costs, no reason was given for 
the absence of insurance markets. One way to motivate the 
absence of such markets is to assume that individual labor 
income is private information, that is, cannot be known (at 
least costlessly) by anyone else. The insurance arrange-
ment I outlined above is not feasible since the insurance 
company cannot verify the individual's labor income. The 
individual will always claim to have received the lowest 
labor income regardless of the actual labor income, and 
the market will collapse. Presumably, some other arrange-
ment that respects the privacy of information regarding in-
dividual labor income will arise, but there is no reason 
why it should look exactly like the credit market arrange-
ment. (For work along these lines, see Townsend 1979, 
Green 1987, Phelan and Townsend 1991, and Atkeson 
and Lucas 1992.) Therefore, the implications for asset 
returns are likely to be different from those arising from 
the credit market arrangement. 
While incomplete markets models with transaction 
costs are considerably more difficult to analyze qualita-
tively and quantitatively than are complete frictionless mar-
kets models, the task is not impossible. In Aiyagari and 
Gertler 1991, a model of the type I have described here 
was used to conduct a number of quantitative experiments 
and study the effects on asset/income ratios and transac-
tion velocities. However, the model abstracted from aggre-
gate dividend risk. It would be highly desirable to allow 
for aggregate dividend risk, so that some portion of the 
equity premium reflects the riskiness of stock returns. 
There appear to be significant computational difficulties in 
taking this feature into account. Some research effort is 
currently being devoted to overcoming these difficulties, 
and I hope to be able to report on the progress of this 
work in the not-too-distant future. 
28See Aiyagari and Gertler 1991 for a quantitative analysis of the type of model 
described here. That study uses specific functional forms and parameter values and 
reports the implications of the model for asset/income ratios and relative transaction 
velocities. 
29Mankiw and Zeldes (1991) also emphasize (though for somewhat different 
reasons) the importance of distinguishing between individuals who regularly hold stocks 
and those not inclined to do so. 
30AS noted earlier, there appear to be dramatic differences in the portfolios held 
by individuals with different wealth levels. A substantial fraction of liquid assets is held 
by a group of households who own relatively little stocks, and the ownership of stocks 
is heavily concentrated. Recall, for example, that Avery, Elliehausen, and Kennickell 
(1988) estimate that in 1963 the bottom 90 percent of the U.S. wealth distribution held 
53 percent of the total quantity of liquid assets but only 9 percent of the equity, while 
the top 1 percent held over 60 percent of the equity but only 10 percent of liquid assets. 
30 S. Rao Aiyagari 
Financial Market Facts 
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